INSINGER DE BEAUFORT MANAGER SELECTION

(Société d'Investissement à Capital Variable)

Audited Annual Report
for the Year
ended December 31, 2001

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General Information

The annual general meeting of shareholders of INSINGER DE BEAUFORT MANAGER SELECTION (the "SICAV", the "Fund") shall be held at the registered office of the SICAV or at such other place in Luxembourg on the last Wednesday of the month of April of each year at 11.30 a.m. If this is not a bank business day in Luxembourg, it will be held on the next bank business day.

Notifications of all general meetings shall be published in the "Mémorial, Recueil des Sociétés et Associations" of Luxembourg (the "Mémorial") and in at least one Luxembourg newspaper as far as this is required by Luxembourg law. The notification shall be sent to the holders of registered shares by mail, in accordance with Luxembourg Law, at least eight days prior to the meeting at their addresses in the register of shareholders. The Board of Directors may decide at its sole discretion to publish the notification in any other newspaper.

These notices shall include the agenda and specify the time and place of the meeting and the conditions of admission and shall also refer to the requirements of Luxembourg law with regard to the necessary quorum and majorities required for the meeting.

The requirements as to attendance, quorum and majorities at all general meetings shall be those of the Articles 67 and 67-1 of the law of 10th August 1915 (as amended) of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Articles of Incorporation.

The audited annual reports shall be published within 4 months after the financial year-end and the unaudited semi-annual reports shall be published within 2 months after the end of the relevant period. The reports shall include separate information on each of the Sub-Funds as well as combined information on all of the Sub-Funds. The reports shall be available at the registered office of the SICAV during normal business hours. The financial year-end of the Fund is December 31 of each year.

A detailed schedule of portfolio movements for each Sub-Fund is available free of charge upon request at the registered office of the SICAV.

The net asset values and the issue, conversion and redemption prices of the shares in any Sub-Fund shall be made public and available at the registered office of the SICAV. Shares of all the Sub-Funds, as and when issued, shall be listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange.

Under current legislation and practice, shareholders are not subject to any capital gains, income, withholding, inheritance or other taxes in Luxembourg (except for shareholders domiciled, resident or having a permanent establishment in Luxembourg and for certain former residents of Luxembourg owning more than 25% of the share capital of the SICAV).

Investors should consult their professional advisers on the possible tax or other consequences of buying, holding, converting, transferring or selling any of the shares under the laws of their countries of citizenship, residence or domicile.

Market Synopsis – The Year 2001

Economic Overview

In early January 2001, the US Federal Reserve Governor, Alan Greenspan, unexpectedly cut interest rates in response to the deteriorating economic environment. By the end of 2001, the US Fed Funds Rate had been cut 11 times, from 6.5% to 1.75%, its lowest level in 40 years. Such unprecedented monetary easing is best understood in light of the two major economic forces at play in 2001:

- The normal liquidity cycle: economic growth responds to changes in interest rates. In the same manner that the interest rate hikes had succeeded in slowing the economy, it was expected that the series of rate cuts would assist an economic recovery.
- Unwinding the technology investment boom: the second force concerns the required unwinding of the excesses of the technological investment boom. It was (and still is) this aspect which is more difficult to predict, and where the majority of the uncertainty rested (and still rests).

It became clear as the year progressed that the unwinding of the excesses of the technology investment bubble was severely impeding prospects of a cyclical recovery. This led to the US Fed continuing its monetary easing. Two of the major excesses were that:

- Both corporations and individuals were burdened with unprecedented levels of debt, meaning that it would be difficult to finance any recovery by further borrowing, especially since there was already substantial overcapacity in the system. Rates would have to be substantially cut to encourage stretched corporations and consumers to borrow;
- There existed an equity overhang, resulting from the irrational exuberance of the tech bubble. This meant that although stock prices had fallen, they were still overvalued by any absolute measures. This would place a ceiling on any stock market rally.

The US recession is recognized to have begun in March 2001. The distinguishing feature of this recession is that it was brought about not by a decrease in final demand, which would have occurred had consumers stopped spending, but rather by overcapacity in supply. The over-investment in TMT during the late 1990's led to enormous excesses. Recognition of these excesses was accompanied by decreasing industrial production and a generally slowing economy. It was only the continued spending of US consumers that provided an illusion that the economy was not in recession.

The US economy was already in recession prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, although this fact was not known at the time. It was only after the attacks that many of those sitting on the fence viz. the US sliding into a recession finally acknowledged that recession was a certainty. The US Fed and central banks worldwide continued pumping liquidity into the system following the attacks, and the US government's tax rebates and other fiscal stimuli were expected to provide extra boosts to the economy.

By the end of the year, it appeared that increased liquidity was indeed feeding through to the system. There were positive indications, such as decelerations in the rate of decline of industrial production and employment, and an increasing US Leading Economic Indicator (LEI). The year ended with the prospect that inventory rebuilding, financed by low interest rates, would provide a boost to the economy and set the stage for a speedy recovery. Yet the shape and substance to be taken by this US cyclical recovery should be understood in light of the excesses of the tech boom, most especially the continued record high debt levels that should provide resistance to a strong and sustainable recovery.

This play between the economic cycle and the technology bubble overhang took place in the Eurozone and to a lesser extent in Japan. Yet the aggressive monetary reflation implemented in the US was not followed as readily by the European Central Bank (ECB), who were plagued by inflation concerns. Europe lagged the US in the downturn, and is also expected to lag the US in the recovery.

Japan faces more serious problems. 2001 saw Japan falling into its third recession in ten years. A combination of persistent deflation, a practically bankrupt financial sector, and a government in no position to provide economic stimulus provide a bleak picture with poor prospects. Measures to restore the financial sector would have serious negative impacts on the economy as a whole and lead to further rises in bankruptcies and unemployment. Authorities continue to prefer a gradual approach, and so problems persist or worsen.

Currencies

The US Dollar appeared to be facing many head winds during the year but remained remarkably strong. Under normal circumstances record current account deficits, falling and low real interest rates, a relatively weak economy and a collapsing stock exchange (the NASDAQ) would have had a powerful negative impact on a currency, yet the Dollar held its ground.

Market Synopsis - The Year 2001 (continued)

The US continues to be the promised land to the rest of the world, allowing capital flows to remain sufficiently large to support the currency. US demographics remain relatively healthy and the country is generally considered to be the last global power. The US economy should be the first one to show signs of recovery, which would result in stronger demand for the currency. Taking into account current levels, we would however still expect the US Dollar to continue to trade sideways against the Euro.

2001 saw the US Dollar as well as the Euro strengthen against the Yen. Assuming that Japan will be unable to resolve its problems short-term, even through drastic economic reform, the Yen will likely drop further.

Fixed Income

Bonds went though a number of stages in the year, representing the conflicting views that also impacted equity markets. With the exception of Japan, where reduced optimism over a speedy reform package and worse than expected economic news led investors to push government yields lower, US and European government bonds yields ended the first half of the year higher. Yet as the US Fed continued to cut interest rates, and it became clear that the downturn was more serious than expected, yields were pushed lower, bottoming in the aftermath of the September terrorist attacks, before climbing rapidly in the last quarter. The year ended with a very steep yield curve, suggesting that investors were discounting a powerful recovery in 2002.

Although relatively volatile during the year, nominal yields generally ended the year close to their beginning of year levels. Both US and German government bond yields ended 2001 less than 10 basis points off their initial levels. Japan, with its worsening economic conditions, saw better overall performance in bond market, with the 10-year government yield decreasing from 1.65 to 1.35.

Equities

The strong recovery discounted by a steep US yield curve was echoed by the equity valuations at the end of 2001. Stock prices were discounting returns to peak earnings in 2002, allowing little room for further stock appreciation. This will provide serious resistance to any attempts to rally off the year-end levels.

Equities were volatile throughout the year, as bulls and bears battled for prominence. With each piece of encouraging economic or corporate news, markets would rally, only to be followed by a slump as the rally ran out of steam and further dismal news (of which there was a great deal) fed through to the markets. The April lows were comprehensively broken in September, when global sell-offs occurred following the terrorist attacks.

After this sell-off, many argued that equities were undervalued on a relative basis to bonds, and a rally ensued, seeing most markets rising above their pre-September levels by the end of the year. This should be understood as a liquidity driven cyclical rally within a secular bear or sideways market. A liquidity driven rally had been expected for a long time, and the capitulation following the terrorist attacks provided the right conditions for the rally to begin. Yet the rally stalled as it ran into the headwinds of already high absolute valuations.

The year ended with most major indices down for the year. The tech heavy NASDAQ was the hardest hit US index (although it was also the index that recovered the most after the September lows). It was down 21% for the year. The S&P 500 was down 13%. European markets were generally down about 17%, and Japan's Nikkei was down a dismal 30%

Outlook for 2002

The house view is that equity markets worldwide have hit a super-cycle top. This means that equity markets will be in a secular sideways market for 5-10 years as the excesses of the late 1990's are slowly worked off through a gradual consolidation process. A combination of a structural decline in consumer demand and high levels of consumer debt provide a bleak picture of a stretched consumer unable to support the level of growth to which we have become accustomed over the past twenty years. Equity returns are further capped by what are still very high equity valuations.

Bond and equity markets both discount a strong V-shaped recovery in 2002, as is evident from the steep yield curve and high equity valuations. If the recovery disappoints, which we judge to be the most likely scenario, then there will be strong downside pressure on equities. We expect, at best, muted equity returns in 2002. Given that we expect continued low inflationary pressures in 2002, we favour bonds, which will benefit from a poorer than expected economic recovery.

Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Equity

Director's Report

The NAV of Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Equity A went from USD 86.81 at the beginning of this year to USD 73.24 at the end of the year. This translated in an annual return of -15.63 %, whereas the benchmark MSCI World during the same period returned –17.26%. While 2001 was in absolute terms by no means a year to remember, in relative terms we were thus able to outperform our benchmark by 1.63%. The NAV of the B Class (GBP) went from GBP 87.04 to GBP 75.58, an annual return of -13.17%. The Euro C Class dropped –11.42% from EUR 87.37 at the beginning of the year to EUR 77.39 at 31 December 2001.

In the US, Wellington did very well during 2001, and over the course of the year we added significantly to our position in the fund. As such, it became the biggest holding in our multi-manager portfolio, a title previously claimed by Credit Suisse. That particular fund ended the year with a slight underperformance due to unfavourable stock picking in the technology and telecommunications sectors. Because the Credit Suisse offers a nice style diversification with Wellington we still hold it in our portfolio, but it is subject to increased scrutiny and could be replaced when we identify a better complement to Wellington. In April of 2001, we introduced Cambrian into the opportunity segment of our US equity portfolio. This fund manager that invests in a concentrated group of industrial mid cap value stocks has returned 30% since then where the index has remained flat. Quite remarkably, the fund manager has managed to record similar returns since the fund launched in 1992, a time period that has seen a wide variety of market circumstances. Robeco did not perform very well during the first half of the year. A major input in their management of US equities comes from a quantitative model driven mainly by momentum indicators. During the periods of high volatility this year, Robeco had not been able to perform well. In September they managed to outperform the MSCI USA index by a healthy margin, which we used as an opportunity to liquidate our position. This was based on our view that the equity markets would stay volatile for the foreseeable period. Robeco has since continued to under perform the MSCI USA index.

In Europe, our biggest holding is with Gartmore fund manager Roger Guy. During the first few months of the year he underperformed the MSCI Europe ex UK index. Although it was neutrally positioned on the sector level, the markets favoured value stocks during this period that, according to the manager, lacked the earnings fundamentals to sustain such an outperformance. By sticking to his selective approach and his focus on fundamentals the manager eventually ended 2001 with an outperformance. Eduardo Mercadente of Mercury, who follows a theme, based investment approach to European mid cap stocks profited from the relatively strong performance of this asset class compared to large caps. However, during the latter half of the year, he underperformed the smaller companies benchmark which on its own fared worse than the large cap index. As a result the manager recorded an underperformance for the year 2001. Going forward, we foresee some changes in our European portfolio. By introducing new managers we intend to add a level of style diversification that should ultimately improve the overall risk return profile.

Our UK portfolio consists of two managers: Tim Russell of HSBC for core investments, and Colin McLein of Scottish Value Management for opportunity investments. Tim Russell's management style sets itself apart in that it has consistently added value over time in small increments. The past year proved to be no exception, and he ended the year by outperforming the MSCI UK index by a healthy margin. This result could have been better even were it not for a short affair with smaller capitalisation stocks gone sour over the summer. From a style diversification perspective, the SVM is well positioned in our UK portfolio. However, it has disappointed in terms of performance during 2001, and subsequently it is a candidate for replacement.

Martin Currie represents our core holding in the Japanese portfolio. The manager, Michael Thomas, has a very impressive track record, which he continued throughout 2001. A detailed attribution analysis of the fund covering the whole year shows that all the outperformance resulted from strong stockpicking, whereas sector selection actually detracted from performance. Hiroshi Tateda, Japanese manager of Mercury, disappointed in the last two months of 2001, although for the year he outperformed by a healthy margin. Since some of his bigger holdings have not performed well, we are now monitoring this fund more closely.

In the Asia Pacific ex Japan region we started the year with an investment with Henderson's Kirsteen Morrison. It performed slightly under the index for the first few months until Kirsteen Morrison left to assume responsibility in another division within the company. We therefore swapped our investments to Aberdeen with whom we were already invested through our dedicated Asia ex Japan multi-manager fund. That manager has since outperformed his benchmark and added value for our Asia Pacific ex Japan portfolio.

Review of the sub-funds (continued)

Outlook & Strategy

A recovery in the global economy is widely predicted; disagreement exists only on the speed and the extent of this recovery. For the equity markets, however, a widespread return to corporate profitability is of greater importance. In 2001 we saw aggressive cost cutting resulting in numerous layoffs and a scaling down of inventory levels. Profit margins are likely to stay depressed however due to remaining overcapacity in many sectors. A return of profitability will therefore largely depend on the willingness of consumers and businesses to start spending more heavily.
As mentioned above, we expect to make some changes in our portfolios during the coming year in response and in anticipation of the changing environment in the global financial markets. We are confident that as a result we will be able to deliver above market returns to our investors.

The directors propose to remove the GBP B class during 2002. This decision was taken due to economic reasons and the difficulty in applying hedging techniques to this share class.

Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced

Director's Report

The NAV of Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced A went from USD 93.57 at the beginning of this year to USD 85.54 at the end of the year. This translated in an annual return of -8.58%, whereas the benchmark (60% MSCI World, 40% JP Morgan Global Government Bond hedged) during the same period returned –7.90%. Year 2001 was thus not a year to remember, in both absolute terms and in relative terms as we underperformed our benchmark by –0.68%. The NAV of the B Class (GBP) went from GBP 92.49 to GBP 85.88, an annual return of –7.15%. The Euro C Class dropped –6.22% from EUR 95.14 at the beginning of the year to EUR 89.22 at 31 December 2001.

World equity markets have completely recouped their losses following the sell-off in September, but have still a long way to go to get back to the high levels reached in March 2000.

Equities

In the US, Wellington did very well during 2001, and over the course of the year we added significantly to our position in the fund. As such, it became the biggest holding in our multi-manager portfolio, a title previously claimed by Credit Suisse. That particular fund ended the year with a slight underperformance due to unfavourable stockpicking in the technology and telecommunications sectors. Because the Credit Suisse offers a nice style diversification with Wellington we still hold it in our portfolio, but it is subject to increased scrutiny and could be replaced when we identify a better complement to Wellington. In April of 2001, we introduced Cambrian into the opportunity segment of our US equity portfolio. This fund manager that invests in a concentrated group of industrial mid cap value stocks has returned 30% since then where the index has remained flat. Quite remarkably, the fund manager has managed to record similar returns since the fund launched in 1992, a time period that has seen a wide variety of market circumstances. Robeco did not perform very well during the first half of the year. A major input in their management of US equities comes from a quantitative model driven mainly by momentum indicators. During the periods of high volatility this year, Robeco had not been able to perform well. In September they managed to outperform the MSCI USA index by a healthy margin, which we used as an opportunity to liquidate our position. This was based on our view that the equity markets would stay volatile for the foreseeable period. Robeco has since continued to under perform the MSCI USA index.

In Europe, our biggest holding is with Gartmore fund manager Roger Guy. During the first few months of the year he underperformed the MSCI Europe ex UK index. Although it was neutrally positioned on the sector level, the markets favoured value stocks during this period that, according to the manager, lacked the earnings fundamentals to sustain such an outperformance. By sticking to his selective approach and his focus on fundamentals the manager eventually ended 2001 with an outperformance. Eduardo Mercadente of Mercury, who follows a theme, based investment approach to European mid cap stocks profited from the relatively strong performance of this asset class compared to large caps. However, during the latter half of the year, he underperformed the smaller companies benchmark, which on its own fared worse than the large cap index. As a result the manager recorded an underperformance for the year 2001. Going forward, we foresee some changes in our European portfolio. By introducing new managers we intend to add a level of style diversification that should ultimately improve the overall risk return profile.

Review of the sub-funds (continued)

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In the Asia Pacific ex Japan region we started the year with an investment with Henderson's Kirsteen Morrison. It performed slightly under the index for the first few months until Kirsteen Morrison left to assume responsibility in another division within the company. We therefore swapped our investments to Averdeen with whom we were already invested through our dedicated Asia ex Japan multi-manager fund. That manager has since outperformed his benchmark and added value for our Asia Pacific ex Japan portfolio.

Fixed Income

Our core global and US fixed income mandates are with PIMCO. Bill Gross, manager of the US mandate, outperformed the JP Morgan US Government Bond index by more than 2%. Lee Thomas, manager of the global mandate, managed to outperform the JP Morgan Global Government Bond index by more than 5%. In Europe, ABN AMRO covers our core fixed income investments. The manager slightly underperformed the index over 2001. Our European corporate high yield manager, Mercury, suffered from its high exposure to telecommunications and technology issues. The manager underperformed his falling benchmark during 2001, and we have taken appropriate steps by identifying a replacement for our exposure in this segment of the fixed income market. We will hand over our mandate to Lazard starting in the new year; their management team has a better-proven track record of focusing on underlying credit quality of issuers with a substantial in-house research facility. Ashmore has established itself as one of the leading emerging market debt managers over the years, and they have managed our allocation towards this asset class since inception of our funds. In 2001 they returned close to 20%, whereas the JP Morgan EMBI + benchmark fell by more than 2%.

Outlook & Strategy

A recovery in the global economy is widely predicted; disagreement exists only on the speed and the extent of this recovery. For the equity markets, however, a widespread return to corporate profitability is of greater importance. In 2001 we saw aggressive cost cutting resulting in numerous layoffs and a scaling down of inventory levels. Profit margins are likely to stay depressed however due to remaining overcapacity in many sectors. A return of profitability will therefore largely depend on the willingness of consumers and businesses to start spending more heavily.
As mentioned above, we expect to make some changes in our portfolios during the coming year in response and in anticipation of the changing environment in the global financial markets. We are confident that as a result we will be able to deliver above market returns to our investors.

Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan

Director's Report

Since inception in April of this year, the fund's NAV has risen from USD 100 to USD 102.48. This translates in a return of 2.48%, whereas the index during that time period has returned 4.7%. The underperformance has come about in the last quarter of 2001 when the Asian markets excluding Japan have shown a most impressive rebound from the lows reached in September. The MSCI Pacific ex Japan index has returned more than 30% since then, which is far better than the developed regions of the world have done. Our fund managers have been positioned defensively in their portfolios following the world shocking events in September, which potentially could have had a very negative impact on the pacific region since it depends economically for the most part on demand from the developed world. As a result our fund managers have missed out on some of the somewhat surprising gains in the fourth quarter. We remain confident though that our fund managers will outperform over the longer term by superior stock picking, as they have done in the past.

Review of the sub-funds (continued)

It is expected that the markets are braced for a consolidation period following the strong gains recently. However, valuations in the pacific region are still cheap relative to other parts of the world, which combined with a pick up in investor recognition for this area could lead to further gains ahead.

Outlook & Strategy

It is expected that the markets are braced for a consolidation period following the strong gains recently. However, valuations in the pacific region are still cheap relative to other parts of the world, which combined with a pick up in investor recognition for this area could lead to further gains ahead.

Luxembourg, April 23, 2002 The Board of Directors

Auditor's Report

To the Shareholders of
Insinger de Beaufort Manager Selection SICAV:

We have audited the financial statements, which consist of the statement of net assets, the statement of changes in net assets, the schedule of investments and the notes to the financial statements of Insinger de Beaufort Manager Selection SICAV (the "Fund") and of each of its sub-funds for the year ended December 31, 2001. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Board of Directors of the Fund. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audit.

We conducted our audit in accordance with International Standards on Auditing. Those Standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by the Board of Directors of the Fund in preparing the financial statements, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, the attached financial statements described above give, in conformity with Luxembourg legal and regulatory requirements, a true and fair view of the financial position of Insinger de Beaufort Manager Selection SICAV and of each of its sub-funds as of December 31, 2001 and the results of their operations and changes in their net assets for the year then ended.

Supplementary information included in the annual report has been reviewed in the context of our mandate but has not been subject to specific audit procedures carried out in accordance with the standards described above. Consequently, we express no opinion on such information. We have no observation to make concerning such information in the context of the financial statements taken as a whole.

Ernst & Young
Société Anonyme
Réviseur d'entreprises

A. Lockwood

Luxembourg, April 23, 2002

Statement of Net Assets as at December 31, 2001

	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Equity (in USD)	**Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced (in US D)**	*** Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan (in USD)**	**Total (in EUR)**
Assets				
Investments in securities, at cost	19,317,105	32,518,737	3,187,554	62,222,547
Unrealised appreciation (depreciation)	(495,130)	(114,377)	107,563	(567,617)
Investments in securities, at market value (note 2)	18,821,975	32,404,360	3,295,117	61,654,930
Amounts receivable on sales of investments	465,290	432,645	0	1,015,419
Amounts receivable on subscriptions	370,229	1,577,028	0	2,202,032
Formation expenses (note 2)	22,965	16,086	4,488	49,236
	19,680,459	34,430,119	3,299,605	64,921,617
Liabilities				
Bank overdraft	400,640	438,175	1,997	950,822
Amounts payable on purchases of investments	100,000	200,000	0	339,251
Amounts payable on redemptions	18,568	59,015	6,024	94,546
Unrealised loss on forward foreign exchange contracts (note 7)	0	100,855	0	114,051
Advisory commission payable (note 5)	19,281	32,105	3,374	61,925
Taxes and expenses payable (note 3)	45,669	31,524	19,375	109,203
Other liabilities	1,717	4,262	79	6,851
	585,875	865,936	30,849	1,676,649
Total net assets	19,094,584	33,564,183	3,268,756	63,244,968
Number of shares outstanding :			31,895.344	
- "A" shares	44,142.153	18,332.258		
- "B" shares	33,218.315	9,274.096		
- "C" shares	178,587.424	390,910.745		
Net asset value per share :			102.48	
- "A" shares	73.24	85.54		
- "B" shares (in GBP)	75.58	85.88		
- "C" shares (in EUR)	77.39	89.22		

** Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan was launched on April 10, 2001.*

The accompanying notes form an integral part of these financial statements.

Statement of Changes in Net Assets for the Year Ended December 31, 2001

	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Equity (in USD)	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced (in USD)	* Insinger Money Fund (in USD)	** Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan (in USD)	Total (in EUR)
Net assets at the beginning of the year	3,785,410	3,426,732	1,215,668	0	9,077,291
Income					
Dividends, net of taxes	12,551	7,521	0	798	23,601
Bank interest	4,572	7,538	10,297	2,278	27,915
	17,123	15,059	10,297	3,076	51,516
Expenses					
Advisory commission (note 5)	114,711	151,371	480	27,330	332,344
Depositary bank commission	13,070	15,777	4,352	10,291	49,180
Domiciliation, administrative and transfer agent fees	58,466	51,689	5,559	27,914	162,420
Audit fees, printing and publication expenses	13,119	14,853	917	7,303	40,927
Subscription tax (note 6)	1,810	3,906	0	1,323	7,960
Bank charges and correspondent fees	3,839	4,430	9	772	10,234
Bank interest	19,235	29,200	0	3,669	58,921
Amortisation of formation expenses	5,614	4,756	1,054	951	13,994
Other expenses	5,356	5,547	1,664	3,232	17,868
	235,220	281,529	14,035	82,785	693,848
Net loss from investments	(218,097)	(266,470)	(3,738)	(79,709)	(642,332)
Net realised loss on sales of investments (note 2)	(292,319)	(47,286)	0	(85,359)	(480,565)
Net realised profit on forward foreign exchange contracts (note 2)	0	17,364	0	0	19,636
Net realised profit (loss) on foreign exchange	(22,539)	17,708	(77)	(7,463)	(13,990)
Net realised loss	(532,955)	(278,684)	(3,815)	(172,531)	(1,117,251)
Change in net unrealised appreciation (depreciation) on :					
-investments	(290,083)	(53,194)	0	107,563	(266,554)
-forward foreign exchange contracts	0	(100,128)	0	0	(113,229)
Net decrease in net assets as a result of operations	(823,038)	(432,006)	(3,815)	(64,968)	(1,497,034)
Movements in capital					
Issue of shares	17,353,711	33,553,008	0	3,760,763	61,820,066
Redemption of shares	(1,221,499)	(2,983,551)	(1,211,853)	(427,039)	(6,608,552)
	16,132,212	30,569,457	(1,211,853)	3,333,724	55,211,514
Currency translation					453,197
Net assets at the end of the year	19,094,584	33,564,183	0	3,268,756	63,244,968

* See note 1

*** Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan was launched on April 10, 2001.*

The accompanying notes form an integral part of these financial statements.

Changes in the Number of Shares during the Year Ended December 31, 2001

	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Equity		
	"A" shares	"B" shares	"C" shares
Number of shares in issue at the beginning of the year	9,356.345	1,939.974	33,547.753
Number of shares issued	34,794.058	31,394.204	161,610.906
Number of shares redeemed	(8.250)	(115.863)	(16,571.235)
Number of shares in issue at the end of the year	44,142.153	33,218.315	178,587.424

	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced		
	"A" shares	"B" shares	"C" shares
Number of shares in issue at the beginning of the year	12,105.117	9,648.040	10,896.713
Number of shares issued	16,753.896	3,966.851	398,938.910
Number of shares redeemed	(10,526.755)	(4,340.795)	(18,924.878)
Number of shares in issue at the end of the year	18,332.258	9,274.096	390,910.745

	* Insinger Money Fund	** Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan
Number of shares in issue at the beginning of the year	12,097.852	0.000
Number of shares issued	0.000	36,362.498
Number of shares redeemed	(12,097.852)	(4,467.154)
Number of shares in issue at the end of the year	0.000	31,895.344

* See note 1

** *Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan was launched on April 10, 2001.*

The accompanying notes form an integral part of these financial statements.

Statistics

	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Equity (in USD)	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced (in USD)	* Insinger Money Fund (in USD)	** Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan (in USD)
Total net assets as at December 31, 2001	19,094,584	33,564,183	-	3,268,756
Net asset value per share as at December 31, 2001				
			-	102.48
- “A” shares	73.24	85.54		
- “B” shares (in GBP)	75.58	85.88		
- “C” shares (in EUR)	77.39	89.22		
Total net assets as at December 31, 2000	3,785,410	3,426,732	1,215,668	
Net asset value per share as at December 31, 2000			100.49	
- “A” shares	86.81	93.57		
- “B” shares (in GBP)	87.04	92.49		
- “C” shares (in EUR)	87.37	95.14		

* See note 1
** *Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan was launched on April 10, 2001.*

The accompanying notes form an integral part of these financial statements.

Schedule of Investments as at December 31, 2001 (in USD)

Description	Quantity	Acquisition Cost	Market Value (note 2)	% Net Assets
Transferable securities admitted to an official stock exchange listing				
Investment Funds				
US Equity				
Cambrian Fund Ltd. /'a'	2,033	730,000	798,707	4.18
Crédit Suisse Equity Fund - USA /'b' /CAP	6,210	4,290,180	4,260,393	22.31
Wellington Management Portfolios FCP - US Equity Research /'a' /reg.	180,970	5,535,000	5,610,081	29.38
		10,555,180	10,669,181	55.87
Europe ex-UK Equity				
Gartmore Capital Strategy Fund - Continental Europe /pref.	265,974	3,313,220	3,205,791	16.79
Pan-European Equity				
Mercury Selected Trust SICAV - European Opportunities Fund /'a'	11,284	636,488	549,176	2.88
UK Equity				
HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV - UK Equity /'a'	717,674	1,622,426	1,571,599	8.23
SVM - UK Growth Class Fund	55,166	353,032	308,551	1.62
		1,975,458	1,880,150	9.85
Asia ex-Japan Equity				
Aberdeen Prolific International Asia Pacific Fund	278,613	959,928	997,154	5.22
Japan Equity				
Martin Currie Global Funds SICAV - Japan Fund /reg.	109,533	1,218,802	992,370	5.20
Mercury Selected Trust SICAV - Japan Opportunities Fund /'a'	18,422	658,029	528,153	2.77
		1,876,831	1,520,523	7.97
Total investments		19,317,105	18,821,975	98.58

The accompanying notes form an integral part of these financial statements.

INSINGER DE BEAUFORT MULTI-MANAGER EQUITY

Division by Investments as at December 31, 2001

(Expressed as a percentage of net assets)

US Equity	55.87 %
Europe ex-UK Equity	16.79 %
UK Equity	9.85 %
Japan Equity	7.97 %
Asia ex-Japan Equity	5.22 %
Pan-European Equity	2.88 %
	98.58 %

Economic Division of Investments as at December 31, 2001

(Expressed as a percentage of net assets)

Collective Investment Funds	79.50 %
SICAV	19.08 %
	98.58 %

Schedule of Investments as at December 31, 2001 (in USD)

Description	Quantity	Acquisition Cost	Market Value (Note 2)	% Net Assets
Transferable securities admitted to an official stock exchange listing				
Investment Funds				
1) Equity Funds				
US Equity				
Cambrian Fund Ltd. /'a'	2,233	810,000	877,357	2.61
Crédit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP - USA /'b' /CAP	5,031	3,467,497	3,451,397	10.28
Wellington Management Portfolios FCP - US Equity Research /'a' /reg.	214,012	6,550,000	6,634,380	19.77
		10,827,497	10,963,134	32.66
Europe ex-UK Equity				
Gartmore Capital Strategy Fund - Continental Europe /pref.	295,827	3,590,892	3,565,608	10.62
Pan-European Equity				
Mercury Selected Trust SICAV - European Opportunities Fund /'a'	7,403	377,810	360,279	1.07
UK Equity				
HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV - UK Equity /'a'	763,998	1,703,777	1,673,041	4.98
SVM - UK Growth Class Fund	58,949	350,657	329,713	0.98
		2,054,434	2,002,754	5.96
Asia ex-Japan Equity				
Aberdeen Prolific International Asia Pacific Fund	320,522	1,101,580	1,147,148	3.42
Japan Equity				
Martin Currie Global Funds SICAV - Japan Fund /reg.	109,369	1,187,835	990,885	2.95
Mercury Selected Trust SICAV - Japan Opportunities Fund /'a'	20,736	715,238	594,490	1.77
		1,903,073	1,585,375	4.72
Total Equity Funds		19,855,286	19,624,298	58.45
2) Fixed Income Funds				
Emerging Markets Fixed Income				
Ashmore Emerging Markets Liquid Investment Portfolio Fund	230,091	877,188	927,634	2.76
Global Fixed Income				
Pimco Global Investors Series Funds - Institutional Global Bond /'a' /accum.	237,877	3,030,906	3,118,567	9.29
US Fixed Income				
Pimco Advisors Ltd. - Total Return Bond Fund /'a'	237,322	3,062,882	3,123,156	9.31

Schedule of Investments as at December 31, 2001 (in USD)

Description	Quantity	Acquisition Cost	Market Value (Note 2)	% Net Assets
(Pan-) European Fixed Income				
ABN Amro Funds SICAV				
- Europe Bond Fund /'a' /CAP	66,986	4,898,577	4,885,774	14.56
European High Yield Fixed Income				
Mercury Selected Trust SICAV				
- European High Yield Bond Fund /'a' /CAP	101,458	793,898	724,931	2.16
Total Fixed Income Funds		12,663,451	12,780,062	38.08
Total investments		32,518,737	32,404,360	96.53

The accompanying notes form an integral part of these financial statements.

INSINGER DE BEAUFORT MULTI-MANAGER BALANCED

Division by Investments as at December 31, 2001

(Expressed as a percentage of net assets)

1) Equity Funds

US Equity	32.66 %
Europe ex-UK Equity	10.62 %
UK Equity	5.96 %
Japan Equity	4.72 %
Asia ex-Japan Equity	3.42 %
Pan-European Equity	1.07 %
	58.45 %

2) Fixed Income Funds

(Pan-) European Fixed Income	14.56 %
US Fixed Income	9.31 %
Global Fixed Income	9.29 %
Emerging Markets Fixed Income	2.76 %
European High Yield Fixed Income	2.16 %
	38.08 %
	96.53 %

Economic Division of Investments as at December 31, 2001

(Expressed as a percentage of net assets)

Collective Investment Funds	69.04 %
SICAV	27.49 %
	96.53 %

Schedule of Investments as at December 31, 2001 (in USD)

Description	Quantity	Acquisition Cost	Market Value (Note 2)	% Net Assets
Transferable securities admitted to an official stock exchange listing				
Investment Funds				
Asia ex-Japan Equity				
Aberdeen Prolific International Asia Pacific Fund	241,392	847,129	863,941	26.43
First State Investments (UK) Ltd.				
- Asia Pacific Fund /'a' /accum.	329,634	731,709	768,469	23.51
Invesco Asian Equity Core Fund /'a'	540,294	860,050	886,083	27.11
Mellon Global Funds Plc				
- Asian Equity Portfolio /'b'	787,652	748,666	776,624	23.76
		3,187,554	3,295,117	100.81
Total investments		3,187,554	3,295,117	100.81

The accompanying notes form an integral part of these financial statements.

INSINGER DE BEAUFORT MULTI-MANAGER ASIA EX JAPAN

Division by Investments as at December 31, 2001

(Expressed as a percentage of net assets)

Asia ex-Japan Equity	100.81 %

Economic Division of Investments as at December 31, 2001

(Expressed as a percentage of net assets)

Collective Investment Funds	100.81 %

1 - Organisation

INSINGER DE BEAUFORT MANAGER SELECTION is an investment company organised as a Société Anonyme under the laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and qualifies as a “Société d'Investissement à Capital Variable” (SICAV) pursuant to Part II of the Luxembourg Law of March 30, 1988 on collective investment undertakings. The SICAV was incorporated in Luxembourg on May 17, 2000 for an unlimited period. The Articles of Incorporation of the SICAV were published in the "Mémorial, Recueil des Sociétés et Associations", of Luxembourg, on June 22, 2000. The SICAV is registered with the "Registre de Commerce", Luxembourg under number B-75.761.

The Articles of Incorporation of the SICAV and a notice required by Luxembourg law in respect of the issue and sale of shares by the SICAV are on file with the "Greffe du Tribunal d'Arrondissement" of Luxembourg.

The objective of the SICAV is to provide investors with a choice of Sub-Funds investing in a wide range of securities or other legally acceptable assets on a world-wide basis and featuring a diverse array of investment objectives, including capital growth and income, whilst retaining the administrative advantages of one single corporate entity.

The board of directors may create at any moment additional Sub-Funds and/or classes provided that the rights and duties of the shareholders of the existing Sub-Funds and/or Classes will not be modified by such creation. In such case, the prospectus will be up-dated and if different classes are issued within a Sub-Fund, the details of each class will be described in the Appendix relating to the relevant Sub-Fund.

Any shareholder may request the conversion of all or part of its shares of any Sub-Fund and/or class into shares of any other existing Sub-Fund and/or class.

The Board of Directors has decided to close the Sub-Fund “Insinger Money Fund” with effect on February 26, 2001.

On October 12, 2001, the extraordinary general meeting decided to change Insinger Manager Selection to Insinger de Beaufort Manager Selection.

On April 10, 2001, the Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex-Japan Sub-Fund was launched.

At December 31, 2001, the Fund comprised three active Sub-Funds:

Insinger de Beaufort Manager Selection-Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Equity (expressed in USD)

(The net asset value per share is expressed and the subscription price may only be paid for each class in the reference currency of this class).

The aim of the Sub-Fund is to achieve a return commensurate with that offered in global equity markets.

Three classes of shares have been created in the Sub-Fund as to enable investors with different currency profiles to access the same underlying portfolio. The "A" class shares (USD), the "B" class shares (GBP) and the “C” class shares (EURO) aim to achieve the investment objective of long-term capital growth.

All share classes shall be invested in the same underlying portfolio of securities (the "common portfolio"), the only difference being the application of hedging techniques on "B" and “C” class shares in order to minimise the impact of fluctuations in the USD rate of exchange.

Insinger de Beaufort Manager Selection-Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced (expressed in USD)

(The net asset value per share is expressed and the subscription price may only be paid for each class in the reference currency).

The aim of the Sub-Fund is to achieve returns commensurate with those offered in global equity and bond markets.

Three classes of shares have been created in the Sub-Fund as to enable investors with different currency profiles to access to the same underlying portfolio. The "A" class shares (USD), the "B" class shares (GBP) and the “C” class shares (EURO) aim to achieve the investment objective of long-term capital growth.

All share classes shall be invested in the same underlying portfolio of securities (the "common portfolio"), the only difference being the application of hedging techniques on "B" and "C" class shares in order to minimise the impact of fluctuations in the USD rate of exchange.

Insinger de Beaufort Manager Selection-Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan (expressed in USD)

(The net asset value per share is expressed in USD but the subscription and redemption prices may be paid in USD, EUR or GBP, based on the exchange rates applicable on the relevant Valuation day).

The aim of the Sub-Fund is to achieve returns commensurate with those offered in Asian equity markets excluding Japan.

The shares will be fully exposed to fluctuations in the USD exchange rate relative to the major currencies in which the Sub-Fund is invested.

2 - Significant accounting policies

The financial statements have been prepared in conformity with legal and regulatory requirements in Luxembourg, including the following significant accounting policies:

a) Valuation of investments

Transferable securities, which are admitted to an official, exchange listing or dealt in on another regulated market are valued on the basis of the last available price prevailing on the valuation date, and where appropriate at the middle market price. If securities are listed on several stock exchanges or markets, the price on the principal market will be applied.

Transferable securities not admitted to an official exchange listing or dealt in on another regulated market and transferable securities admitted to an official exchange listing or dealt in on another regulated market for which the available price is not representative are valued on the basis of their reasonably foreseeable sales price determined with prudence and good faith by the Board of Directors.

b) Net realised profit (loss) on sale of investments

The net realised profit or loss on sale of investments is determined on the basis of the average cost of investments sold.

c) Foreign currencies

Assets and liabilities expressed in currencies other than the Sub-Fund's currency are translated into the Sub-Fund's currency at the exchange rates prevailing as of December 31, 2001. Income and expenses in currencies other than the Sub-Fund's currency are translated into the Sub-Fund's currency at the exchange rates prevailing at the transaction date.

Principal exchange rate used as at December 31, 2001 : 1 USD = 1.130838 EUR

The various items of the total statement of net assets and the total statement of changes in net assets of the Fund as at December 31, 2001 are equal to the total sum of the corresponding items of the financial statements of each Sub-Fund translated into EUR at the exchange rate ruling as at December 31, 2001.

d) Cost of investment securities

Cost of investment securities expressed in currencies other than the Sub-Fund's currency is translated into the Sub-Fund's currency at the exchange rate applicable at the purchase date.

e) Forward foreign exchange contracts

Outstanding forward foreign exchange contracts are valued on the basis of forward exchange rates prevailing at the relevant valuation date and the resulting unrealised profits or losses are included in the statement of changes in net assets. Realised profits and losses on matured forward foreign exchange contracts are also included in the statement of changes in net assets.

f) Formation expenses

Formation expenses are amortized in equal parts in respect of each Sub-Fund over the first five financial years.

3 - Taxes and expenses payable

	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Equity (in USD)	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced (in USD)	Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan (in USD)
Subscription tax (note 6)	841	2,143	491
Depositary bank commission, domiciliation and administration fees	10,598	6,017	10,280
Audit fees, printing and publication expenses	7,265	4,769	3,166
Other taxes and expenses	26,965	18,595	5,438
	45,669	31,524	19,375

4 - Commission on subscription and redemption of the Fund's shares

A sales charge with a maximum of 5% of the applicable net asset value may be charged in favour of the Investment Manager who shall be responsible for rewarding intermediaries for the distribution of the Sub-Fund shares.

The redemption price of the Fund's shares corresponds to the net asset value per share of the relevant Sub-Fund. No redemption fee is levied.

5 – Advisory commission

Pursuant to an agreement dated May 17, 2000, INSINGER DE BEAUFORT ASSET MANAGEMENT N.V., Amsterdam has been appointed as Investment Manager. The agreement between the SICAV and the Investment Manager makes provision for it to remain in force for an unlimited period and that it may be terminated by either party at any time upon one month notice.

As remuneration for its services, the Investment Manager shall receive from the SICAV an annual fee at the maximum annual rate of 1.50% for Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Equity, Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced and Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Asia Ex Japan applicable on the average net assets of these Sub-Funds. The rate currently being charged in all Sub-Funds is 1.25%.

The Investment Manager shall not receive any performance fee.

6 - Subscription tax

Under current law and practice, the SICAV is not liable to any Luxembourg income tax, nor are dividends paid by the SICAV liable to any Luxembourg withholding tax. However, the SICAV is liable in Luxembourg to a subscription tax of 0.06% per annum of its net assets, such tax being payable quarterly and calculated on the basis of the net assets of all Sub-Funds at the end of the relevant quarter.

No subscription tax is paid on the assets held by the SICAV in other UCITS already subject to that tax in Luxembourg.

7 – Forward foreign exchange contracts

As at December 31, 2001, the Insinger de Beaufort Multi-Manager Balanced had entered into the following outstanding forward foreign exchange contracts:

	Purchases		Sales	Maturity	Unrealised Appreciation/ (depreciation)
GBP	150,000	EUR	239,775	March 13, 2002	5,122
USD	225,000	EUR	253,721	March 13, 2002	1,297
EUR	7,000,000	USD	6,282,600	March 13, 2002	(110,665)
GBP	165,000	USD	234,779	March 13, 2002	3,391
				USD	(100,855)